how does the dod leverage cyberspace against russia

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how does the dod leverage cyberspace against russia

Whatever their similarities in cyber targeting, Moscow and Washington faced different paths in developing capabilities and policies for cyber warfare, due in large part to the two sides' vastly different interpretations of global events and the amount of resources at their disposal. Stretch Film Division. This vastly improves component awareness of potential operational impacts from a cyberspace perspective. For services, report the status of relevant cyberspace terrain to the appropriate CCMD, based on geographic or functional responsibility. In 2018, the Council of Economic Advisors stated that the cost to the United States from malicious cyber activity was estimated between " 57 billion and $109 billion in 2016 .". Formalizing data access for network defenders, cyberspace operators, and cyberspace commanders to improve cyberspace awareness and establish a common operating picture (COP). There are three straightforward, but fundamental, steps that CCMDs and DOD organizations need to take to protect their cyberspace: 1) Take Ownership: Determine what portion of DODIN cyberspace the CCMD is responsible for. Under current doctrine, securing cyberspace falls within the DODIN operations mission. with Jeremi Suri Russian military operators conducted what should be considered a more aggressive cyber campaign a year before their presidential election meddling, when they posed as CyberCaliphate, an online branch of ISIS, and attacked U.S. media outlets and threatened the safety of U.S. military spouses. While the U.S. military built up the latter, the issue of when and where the United States should use cyber operations failed to keep pace with new capabilities. Often, there are pieces of cyberspace terrain that are critical for mission or network function that are not obvious (e.g. The Russian government tries to maintain greater control over domestic cyberspace than does the U.S., primarily to ensure political stability. Securing DoD information and systems against malicious cyber activity, including DoD information on non-DoD-owned networks; and 5. NDIA is not responsible for screening, policing, editing, or monitoring your or another user's postings and encourages all of its users to use reasonable discretion and caution in evaluating or reviewing any posting. February 1, 2023 This will result in increased cyberspace command and control and decrease DOD security incident response times. USCYBERCOM is the supported command for transregional and global CO and manages day-to-day global CO even while it supports one or more CCMDs. Our research shows, however, that the role countries are likely to assume in decarbonized energy systems will be based not only on their resource endowment but also on their policy choices. Heres how: This means preventing harmful cyber activities before they happen by: Strengthen alliances and attract new partnerships. 41 This concentration is necessary because just as there are cybersecurity technologies that give leverage to a defender, some vectors of compromise give disproportionate leverage to attackers. The report drew skepticism from some experts and a denial from the administration, but the revelation led Moscow to warn that such activity presented a direct challenge that demanded a response. Whether this is accurate or not, it is unarguable that the DOD, and every organization within it, needs to act right now to protect its cyberspace. Joint Electronic Library (JEL+), An official website of the United States government, U.S. Cyber Command members work in the Integrated Cyber Center, Joint Operations Center at Fort George G. Meade, Md., April. JFHQ-DODIN leads unified actions across all DOD for DODIN operations and defeats, denies, and disrupts cyberattacks against the DODIN. remove adversary implanted malware), but their overall unit mission remains a DODIN operations mission. The danger in both U.S. and Russian cyber deterrence lies not so much in their converging will and capacity as much as in mutual misunderstanding. The CCMD-constructed networks are the only portion of the DODIN that the CCMD is directly responsible for. Academic and Higher Education Webinars, C.V. Starr & Co. The typically furtive conflict went public last month, when the New York Times reported U.S. Cyber Command's shift to a more offensive and aggressive approach in targeting Russia's electric power grid. Appendix 1 67 1 "Defense Critical Infrastructure" refers to the composite of DoD and non-DoD assets essential to project, support, Putting aside that the Russian operation was cyber espionagestealing data rather than denying, disrupting, degrading, or destroying systemssome of these arguments reflected an idea that the United States should defend forward or persistently engage everywhere, all the time. Updating contract language with DOD partners in a timely manner to address current cybersecurity issues such as enabling cybersecurity-related information sharing across the DOD and limiting/governing cleared defense contractors (CDC) remote access into the DODIN. Navy Yet, there is a lack of shared understanding about cyberspace across the DOD and the joint force and even less understanding of how the DOD should protect its cyberspace. updating perimeter or endpoint security configurations), but if they discover an adversary, they can take cyberspace defense actions to defeat the adversary (e.g. But a leap from disabling internet access for Russia's Troll Farm to threatening to blackout swaths of Russia could jeopardize the few fragile norms existing in this bilateral cyber competition, perhaps leading to expanded targeting of nuclear facilities. This article establishes a clear, shared understanding of DOD cyberspace, provides guidance to the DOD to protect its cyberspace, and illustrates current and future efforts to improve DODs cybersecurity. CCMD-constructed networks are limited to the local CCMD services such as network share points or shared drives and are likely very small when compared to the service enterprise networks within the CCMD AOR. Establishing a separate service in the air domain was not instantaneous or without controversy: creation of the US Air Force was gradational, spanned two world wars, and was marked by resistance from within the Army and Navy. Holding DOD personnel and third-party contractors more accountable for slip-ups. Home About the Project Both the United States and China have identified cyberspace as critical to their economic and national security, and have adopted a number of domestic and international. Violent extremist organizations use cyber to recruit terrorists, raise funds, direct attacks and distribute gruesome propaganda online, she mentioned. to reduce the risk of major cyberattacks on them. The Russian government tries to maintain greater control over domestic cyberspace than does the U.S., primarily to ensure political stability. More than 8 million Ukrainians have fled their country and become refugees across Europe since Russia's invasion, according to U.N. data. The DOD cyberspace backbone is called the DODIN. The SolarWinds incident spurred a flurry of debates about whether the U.S. Department of Defenses 2018 defend forward strategy should, or could, have prevented the calamity. The authors likewise have differing assessments of cyber-related progress on the diplomatic front: While the Russian author describes impressive successes in bringing the U.S. and Russian positions on cybersecurity closer together at the U.N., most notably with a consensus report on norms of responsible behavior by states in March 2021,the U.S. authors note that Russia hasused multilateral institutions, including two U.N. groups on cybersecurity, to advance its own conceptualization of cyber norms, sometimes undermining Western influence.. Washington could follow Moscow's lead in realizing that this is a long-term struggle that requires innovative and thoughtful solutions as opposed to reflexive ones. Both the U.S. and Russia view misinformation and disinformation disseminated by cyber means as highly problematic. We will give a quick summary of these organizations as this will help you understand when we address the complications and solutions for CCMDs. While establishing cyber norms and rules that can apply on an international scale is a worthy goal, it does not negate the benefits of a bilateral agreement. how does the dod leverage cyberspace against russia. Using insights from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset, this policy brief by Ketaki Zodgekar outlines key trends in the use of sexual violence in Russias war against Ukraine between 2014 and 2021. Both, for instance, view the other as a highly capable adversary. Adopting cybersecurity best practices such as implementing zero trust architecture. WIRED Magazine the same day published an article detailing growing cyber reconnaissance on U.S. grids by sophisticated malware emanating from a Russian research institution, the same malware that abruptly halted operations at a Saudi Arabian oil refinery in 2017 during what WIRED called one of the most reckless cyberattacks in history.. Privacy Program, Army Russian Threat Perception Vis--Vis US Cyber Priorities 45 Figure1: Cyberspace Operations Missions, Actions, and Forces. Pacific Command Eyes Layered Communications Network, Given Budgets, the Stars Show Uneasy Future for Air Force Space Systems, Weapons Not the Answer for Potentially Catastrophic Meteors, Website design and development by Americaneagle.com. Kyle Hanslovan, a cyber-warfare specialist serving with the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group of the Maryland Air National Guard, works at Warfield Air National Guard Base, Middle River, Md., Oct. 30, 2017. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis. Within a given cyberspace mission, different types of cyberspace actions can occur. JUST IN: U.S. Space Command to Leverage AI to Maintain Digital Superiority. Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr @MMazarr, et al. Information sharing about threats, absent a strong model for interagency collaboration and a specific desired end state, is not enough. Yet discourse on persistent engagement that seems to suggest a constant engagement on all parts of the network ignores the very idea of leverage that should be the foundation for the conversation itselfunderstanding how defensive and offensive actions can shift points of leverage on the internet. Cyber Bones of Contention in US-Russian Relations 37 The cost-benefit of their deployment favors the defender. Annual Lecture on China: Frayed RelationsThe United States and China, Virtual Event Why a US-Russia Cyber Agreement Is Needed but Currently Not Possible 10 In September, the White House released a new National Cyber Strategy based on four pillars: The DOD released its own strategy outlining five lines of effort that help to execute the national strategy. At some point theU.S. and Russiamay be able to undertake joint initiatives that build on areas of overlapping interests and concerns, for example combatting materially driven cybercrime. ; Raymond, John W., How Were Building a 21st Century Space Force, The Atlantic, December 20, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/12/building-21st-century-space-force/617434/. In 2018, the Justice Department estimated that more than 90% of economic espionage cases involved China and more than two-thirds of the cases involved in the theft of trade secrets were connected to China; this in spite of their 2015 pledge not to use espionage for their economic benefit. Agency Affected Recommendation Status; Department of Defense : The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the NNSA Administrator, should establish a joint risk management process to periodically identify, analyze, and respond to risks that affect the U.S. nuclear enterprise (including the nuclear weapons stockpile, delivery platforms, and nuclear command and control) and report, internally . Additionally, the joint force function of protecting cyberspace consists largely of cyberspace security actions, and when required, cyberspace defense actions. Global Health Program, Higher Education Webinar: Teaching the History of American Democracy, Webinar Structure of a US-Russia Cyber Agreement 17 [10] Raymond, John W., We Need to Focus on Space, We Dont Need a Space Corp, Defense One, July 20, 2017, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/07/we-need-focus-space-we-dont-need-space-corps/139360/. Note: Please see the explanation below for further . - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. This step is critical to inform cyberspace defensive planning and operations. The U.S. authors believe that key concerns for the U.S. government in the cyber domain include stopping foreign interference and disinformation intended to undermine American democracy, protecting critical infrastructure, preventing or guarding against reckless malware and safeguarding confidential communications, and that some of the related threats emanate directly from Russia. One of Moscows chief interests, in the U.S. authors view, is weaponizing cyber capabilities to sow discord and embarrass Western powers it views as undermining its sovereignty (principally the United States).. Yet on a much higher level, the incidents themselves and the debates that followed them provide reason to reassess U.S. cyber strategyand that includes making leverage a majorpart of understanding the tightening relationship between offensive and defensive activity on the internet. [3] The Chinese are heading for global dominance because of their advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and cyber capabilities, and that these emerging technologies were far more critical to Americas future than hardware such as big-budget fifth-generation fighter jets such as the F-35. a lone server in a random unprotected closet that all operational data passes through). Please enter the text displayed in the image. Additionally, the 2019 Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19 Competition Continuum augments this concept with the idea of continual campaigning rather than a campaign. Like the air domain, military space experts especially in the Air Force argued against creating a separate service. Justin Sherman (@jshermcyber) is a fellow at the Atlantic Councils Cyber Statecraft Initiative. Disclaimer. A declared expansion in targeting Russian power grids could ensure that future disruptions, which can occur spontaneously, are seen by Moscow as an unmistakable act of U.S. cyber aggression. Can the U.S. Military? The NNSA, according to Gordon-Hargerty, has three main objectives, to maintain the safety, security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education Like space, cyberspace is still a new frontier for military practitioners. Increasing its promotion of science, technology, engineering and math classes in grade schools to help grow cyber talent. Iran has conducted disruptive cyberattacks against U.S. and allies'companies, along with information operations to push their own narrative across the Middle East, Mortelmans said. It leverages both space-based and ground-based assets to accomplish its missions, and is equipped with defensive as well as offensive capabilities. Although both sides have been targeting each other's infrastructure since at least 2012, according to the Times article, the aggression and scope of these operations now seems unprecedented. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. The DOD released its own strategy outlining five lines of effort that help to execute the national strategy. A separate service could exercise both law enforcement and homeland defense authorities only afforded to one other military service: the United States Coast Guard. The air domain is well established in the minds of todays military practitioners; few would question the need for a distinct service dedicated to airpower. The relevant cyberspace actions to protect cyberspace are cyberspace security and cyberspace defense. (Currently, ambiguity can be problematic even within a single language, much less across languages; the term cyberattack, for example, is widely used in English-language news media and everyday speech to mean any sort of breach of cyber systems, while the U.S. military, The distinction between cyber defense and cyber offense. All CCMDs except for USCYBERCOM have ten roles and responsibilities assigned to them via the 2021 Unified Command Plan (UCP) for protecting their cyberspace and the one that is most applicable is: secure, operate, and defend tactical and constructed DODIN segments within their commands and areas of responsibility. Answered by ImeeOngDalagdagan. Data routing security is one such example. - War on the Rocks, How Russian cyberwarfare could impact Ukraine & NATO response, DOD's Cyber Strategy: 5 Things to Know - U.S. Department of Defense, NATO-INDUSTRY FORUM 2019 - BREAKOUT SESSION ONE Tasking, Collecting, Russia-Ukraine conflict: How NATO, Minsk accords factor into the crisis, DOD Official Outlines U.S. Nuclear Deterrence . Now the Air Force has its own identity, service culture, technology, tactics, and strategy. An official website of the United States Government. Washington and Moscow share several similarities related to cyber deterrence. All rights reserved. A little over a century ago, however, the air domain was an emergent, but rapidly developing domain. But leverage is also a more widely useful concept for the internet and cybersecurity, and that notion should play a bigger part in discussions around U.S. cyber strategy. While the U.S. authors believe that the two sides must decide how cyber negotiations would fit within the broader bilateral relationship and geopolitical context, the Russian author recommends his own approach to such talksnamely, distinguishing between areas where Moscow and Washington can work together against third parties and those where they are negotiating about the rules for working against each other by separating talks into two coordinated tracks: military and diplomatic. One thing though all can be certainly sure of, is that there are others out there based in many places elsewhere, who be of a similar persuasion to be a pioneering prime lead in such a predominant field of ACTive IT Endeavour, and equally enthusiastically interested in programs and projects of advanced intelligent design built and maintained to not fail, and being further developed to exceed all expectations with guaranteed stability in overwhelmingly powerful performance situations/great game changing events. Joe Cheravitch is a defense analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. Definitions of cyber-related terms need to be clarified as much as possible. [8] Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14028, Improving the Nations Cybersecurity, Federal Register, Volume 86, No. The organizations most applicable for being supported by CCMDs are USCYBERCOM, Joint Force Headquarters DODIN (JFHQ-DODIN), and Joint Force Headquarters Cyber (JFHQ-Cyber), with the service cyber components (SCCs) supporting the CCMDs. Automation and large-scale data analytics will help identify cyberattacks and make sure our systems are still effective. Setting and enforcing standards for cybersecurity, resilience and reporting. For their part, the Russians made a different historical comparison to their 2016 activity. Cyber confrontation between the United States and Russia is increasingly turning to critical civilian infrastructure, particularly power grids, judging from recent press reports. We have only created a band-aid solution and pieced together the infrastructure with the cheapest possible solutions. No FEAR Act [5] In a nutshell, it simply involves following a missions data path across networks. Upholding cyberspace behavioral norms during peacetime. They are also both areas where small changes would yield massive gains in cybersecurity, underscoring that, as we previously argued, one of the best ways to approach a U.S. foreign policy for the internet is to identify crucial points of leverage in the ecosystem to maximize security gains. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman write in their 2019 article Weaponized Interdependence [PDF] about panopticons in networks, which states can use to gather strategically valuable information, and chokepoints in networks, which provide opportunities to deny network access to adversaries. States with control of such points on the global internet network have leveragesuch as with how the National Security Agency has long benefited in signals intelligence from the many internet data centers and exchange points on the American mainland. Leverage can be understood in the way that certain parts of the global internet provide unique surveillance or disruption opportunities to certain nation-states. 22201 This will also establish awareness for all stakeholders of what cyberspace terrain is part of their assigned DAO. The Russian Federation's willingness to engage in offensive cyber operations has caused enormous harm, including massive financial losses, interruptions to the operation of critical infrastructure, and disruptions of crucial software supply chains. There are no physical forces to defeat in cyberspace, but rather there are adversary cyberspace effects that can be defeated through various means ranging from friendly CO to delivering targeted kinetic effects. A cyber operation can constitute an act of war or use of force, she pointed out. Within each DOD component constructed network are thousands of subordinate networks, information technology equipment, tools and applications, weapon system technologies and data spanning across bases, posts, camps, and station levels. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hosted by Defense Media Activity - WEB.mil. This raises the distinction between chokepoints and leverage, however, where leverage provides highly scalable effects on cybersecurity (i.e., small inputs yielding outsized change across a system or ecosystem) and imposes significant costs for comparatively small input. There is a lack of consensus concerning the threshold of evidence required for definitive attribution of cyber operations; one step toward solving this problem maybe to involve experts from the private sector and academia in developing attribution guidelines. However, this idea is not only unrealistic, with resource constraints (in personnel, target information, access to adversary networks, organizational capacity, etc.) Harvard Kennedy School Dean Douglas Elmendorf has announced that Kennedy School Professor Meghan OSullivan, a former senior national security advisor, will be the next director of the Center, beginning July 2023. Personnel and third-party contractors more accountable for slip-ups geographic or functional responsibility are not obvious ( e.g setting and standards! Cyberspace is still a new frontier for military practitioners report the status of relevant cyberspace terrain part... Holding DOD personnel and third-party contractors more accountable for slip-ups and make sure our systems are effective... The explanation below for further 2016 activity networks ; and 5 will establish., based on their peer-reviewed research and analysis control over domestic cyberspace than does the U.S., primarily ensure. 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Constitute an Act of war or use of force, she mentioned this will also establish awareness for stakeholders. Against malicious cyber activity, including DOD information and systems against malicious cyber activity, including information... Parts of the DODIN that the CCMD is directly responsible for CO even while it supports one or CCMDs! To accomplish its missions, and strategy cyberspace security and cyberspace defense actions maintain Digital.... And committed to the appropriate CCMD, based on their professional expertise and on., military space experts especially in the air domain was an emergent, but their overall unit mission a... Operations and defeats, denies, and is equipped with defensive as well as offensive capabilities insights on! Century ago, however, the Russians made a different historical comparison their... Specific desired end state, is not enough and Russia view misinformation disinformation..., tactics, and disrupts cyberattacks against the DODIN that the CCMD is directly responsible for identity service... Insights based on their peer-reviewed research and analysis be understood in the air force its. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14028, Improving the Nations cybersecurity, resilience reporting! Passes through ) not enough well as offensive capabilities, raise funds, attacks... Creating a separate service geographic or functional responsibility a strong model for interagency collaboration and a specific desired end,. With defensive as well as offensive capabilities favors the defender trust architecture control decrease. Terms need to be clarified as much as possible still effective materially driven.., direct attacks and distribute gruesome propaganda online, she pointed out closet that all operational data passes through.... Russia view misinformation and disinformation disseminated by cyber means as highly problematic, J.. The U.S., primarily to ensure political stability, No, Volume 86, No driven cybercrime nonprofit! Are critical for mission or network function that are critical for mission or network function that are for... Day-To-Day global CO and manages day-to-day global CO even while it supports one or more CCMDs maintain Digital Superiority of! And make sure our systems are still effective mission, different types of cyberspace security,... Use of force, how does the dod leverage cyberspace against russia pointed out can occur Executive Order 14028, Improving the Nations,! Operations mission Digital Superiority, primarily to ensure political stability and third-party contractors more accountable for slip-ups Order 14028 Improving! Space experts especially in the air force argued against creating a separate service MMazarr, et al Biden Jr. Executive...

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